Perimeters of Democracy by Fryer, Heather
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
University of Nebraska Press -- Sample Books 
and Chapters University of Nebraska Press 
Spring 2010 
Perimeters of Democracy 
Heather Fryer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/unpresssamples 
 Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons 
Fryer, Heather, "Perimeters of Democracy" (2010). University of Nebraska Press -- Sample Books and 
Chapters. 102. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/unpresssamples/102 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Nebraska Press at 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Nebraska Press 
-- Sample Books and Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
perimeters of democracy
Buy the Book
ii | Runninghead
Buy the Book
inverse utopias and the
wartime social landscape
in the american west
heather fryer
University of Nebraska Press | Lincoln and London
Buy the Book
© 2010 by the Board of Regents  
of the University of Nebraska.  
All rights reserved. Manufactured  
in the United States of America. 
Library of Congress Cataloging-
in-Publication Data
Fryer, Heather. 
Perimeters of democracy : inverse uto-
pias and the wartime social landscape in 
the American West / Heather Fryer. 
p. cm. 
Includes bibliographical references and 
index. 
isbn 978-0-8032-2033-1 (cloth : alk. 
paper) 
1.  Government-controlled commu-
nities—United States.  2. World War, 
1939–1945—United States.  3. Internal 
security—United States—History—20th 
century.  4. Klamath Indian Reservation 
(Or.)—Social conditions—20th century. 
5. Los Alamos (N.M.)—Social condi-
tions—20th century.  6. Topaz (Utah)—
Social conditions—20th century. 
 7. Vanport (Or.)—Social conditions—
20th century.  8. West (U.S.)—Social 
conditions—20th century.  I. Title.  
d769.8.g68f79 2010 
307.770978’09044—dc22 
2009047713 
Set in Quadraat by Kim Essman.
Designed by Nathan Putens.
Buy the Book
Contents
  List of Illustrations vii
  Acknowledgments ix 
  Introduction: Discovering the 
Inverse-Utopian West 1
 1.  Beware of Crafty Bandits: Enmification 
in the Empire for Liberty 35
 2. The Great Citizenship Pantomime: Politics 
and Power in a Barbed-Wire Democracy 83
 3. Cultivating Dependency: Economics and 
Education in America’s Inverse Utopias 126
 4. Tragic Ironies: Everyday Life in 
an Inverse Utopia 171
 5. From Barbed Wire to Bootstraps: Freedom 
and Community in Cold War America 213
 6. Termination of the Klamath Reservation:  
From Inverse Utopia to Indian Dystopia 250
 7. No Camps for Commies: The Dual Legacies 
of Dissonance and Dissidents 276
  Notes 313
  Bibliography 351
  Index 373
Buy the Book
Buy the Book
Illustrations
Following p. 72
Klamath tribal police
Students, Klamath Agency School
Klamath residents
Topaz panorama view
Topaz Community Council
Vanport street scene
Vanport ration counter
Los Alamos aerial view
High security passage, Los Alamos
Following p. 212
Billboard, Klamath Reservation
Klamath Honor Roll
Boys playing football, Topaz
Barrack interior, Topaz
Flood waters, Vanport
African American Vanporters
Vanport flood victims
Efficiency apartment, Los Alamos
“E” Award ceremony, Los Alamos
Putting Los Alamos County on the map
map
Inverse Utopias in the  
United States, 1943 30
Buy the Book
Buy the Book
Acknowledgments
This book got its start in a graduate seminar in urban history taught in 
1997 by Marilynn Johnson, whose book The Second Gold Rush: Oakland 
and the East Bay during World War II lit up my historical imagination. War 
mobilization and the complicated social geography of the American 
West became instant fascinations. So too did the commonalities between 
Oakland and the lost city of Vanport, Oregon, which resided in a hazy 
place in the historical memories of Pacific Northwesterners.
This fascination quickly became a dissertation topic under Lynn’s 
direction. When she gently suggested a comparative study of Vanport 
and another community (probably meaning one), I proposed compar-
ing five before narrowing it down to four. If my insistence on studying a 
bunch of places I knew next to nothing about made Lynn doubt my com-
mon sense, she never showed it. Always generous with her knowledge, 
wisdom, and time, she helped me build the foundation for Perimeters 
of Democracy and for my practice as a historian more generally. Cynthia 
Lynn Lyerly and Kevin Kenny, as members of my dissertation commit-
tee, pressed me to bring real precision to this comparative analysis. The 
History Department at Boston College also lent its support through a 
dissertation fellowship that funded the greater part of the research for 
Perimeters of Democracy, along with an Albert J. Beveridge Grant from the 
American Historical Association.
The Creighton University College of Arts and Sciences and my col-
leagues in the History Department provided everything from release time 
to reorganize the manuscript to the moral support necessary for seeing a 
long project through. Julie Fox saved the day before a deadline more than 
once, helping me get overwhelming piles of paper into the mail on time. I 
am tremendously grateful to the Reinert Alumni Library staff, which did a 
thousand favors and worked a few miracles to keep my research going.
Sustained research can be a rough road, so I was fortunate to find so 
many brilliant librarians and archivists across the country to help smooth 
Buy the Book
x | Acknowledgments
the way. The staff of the Los Alamos Historical Museum and Archives 
was helpful and hospitable, as were the professionals at the Bancroft 
Library who went out of their way to help me locate documents and illus-
trations. Todd Kepple and Lynn Jeche at the Klamath County Museum 
located Klamath Reservation photographs and made them available to 
me in Omaha, and the National Archives Pacific Coast branch in Seattle 
helped me navigate Record Group 75, even in the immediate aftermath 
of the 6.0 earthquake that brought my first research day to an unsettling 
halt. The Truman Presidential Library, and Dennis Bilger in particular, 
took extraordinary time and care in locating valuable material on all four 
communities. I also relied heavily on the resources of the Multnomah 
County Public Library in Portland, Oregon, especially the beautiful Sterling 
Room for Writers, where much of the first draft was written.
The Oregon Historical Society (ohs) deserves special mention, not 
only for giving me a start as a volunteer researcher from 1992–95 but 
also for allowing me to use their reading room as my home base for two 
years. Not only did they act as real partners in my research, bringing to 
light sources I would never know to look for, they were wonderful people 
to spend time with.
ohs is also where I met Sieglinde Smith, librarian and treasured friend 
to many historians, who gave me my first lessons in archival research. 
I am also indebted to Franklin Brummett and Barbara Alatorre, who 
after agreeing to sit for just a single interview with me became long-
term consultants on Vanport and the Klamath Reservation, respectively. 
They offered valuable perspectives as independent historians and former 
residents of both communities.
My interviews with Regina Flowers, Jim and Fumi Onchi, Vern Marshall, 
Diane Norstrand, Ramona Rank, George Saslow, and June Schumann, 
while brief, helped me see the connections between the four inverse 
utopias. Where most people would ignore an inquiry about their lives 
from a stranger, they were tremendously generous in sharing their time 
and their recollections.
I am deeply grateful to my editor at the University of Nebraska Press, 
Heather Lundine, who has seen this project through its transformation 
from four discrete case studies to its current thematic form (which, 
Buy the Book
 Acknowledgments | xi
frankly, is so much better). She, Bridget Barry, and Joeth Zucco led the 
exciting transformation from manuscript to book, making the publish-
ing process a truly rewarding experience. Christopher Steinke’s keen and 
insightful copyediting brought great clarity to the final version of the text. I 
also want to thank the anonymous readers whose comments and critiques 
helped immensely in the conceptual and narrative development of the 
manuscript. The final product is far richer for your generous input.
I could not have completed this project without the love and support 
of my family and friends, who at times probably felt like this project had 
taken over their lives as well as mine. Tracy Leavelle, my partner in all 
things, was ever ready with an editor’s pencil, a cup of tea, or a minute 
to talk through a fuzzy idea. Amy Bográn shared half of a studio apart-
ment when I had just a pocket full of fellowship money and two years 
of research ahead of me. My father passed away in 2004, but his love of 
history has made its mark on this volume. My mother, who probably 
thought she would be done shuttling kids from place to place years ago, 
was still dropping her thirty-something daughter off at the library during 
my visits to her home in Oregon. Visits home never turned all work and 
no play: my sisters, Holly and Stephanie, reminded me to take much-
needed down time, and my nephew and nieces — Patrick, Sophie, and 
Olivia — were always right there with the comic relief, reminding their 
occasionally frazzled auntie why searching the past to chart new pos-
sibilities for the future is well worth the labor.
Buy the Book
Buy the Book
perimeters of democracy
Buy the Book
Buy the Book
Discovering the Inverse-Utopian West
Hard as it is to believe, there is a ghost town in the cen-
ter of the Portland International Raceway. The foundations are vaguely 
discernible at the center of the track, and the stories are etched into 
the collective memory of lifelong Portlanders. For most, the details are 
vague: Vanport City (later shortened to “Vanport”) was one of the many 
miracles of war production in 1942, built on 648 acres to house about 
40,000 shipyard workers on a twenty-four-hour production schedule. 
It was rumored among Portlanders during the war that this motley crew 
of “Americans all” led a wild life in their out-of-the-way enclave on the 
floodplain: they drank, danced, plotted revolution, and even encouraged 
whites and blacks to mingle. But just as quickly as the “miracle city” rose 
to keep the rabble in the shipyards and away from Portland, it vanished 
under surging floodwaters in 1948. Now, the roar of engines and cheers 
of racing fans make it hard to envision rows of government-issue apart-
ments clustered around government-run stores, theaters, day-care centers, 
schools, patrols, bus routes, and all the other small-town amenities. It 
is even harder to imagine that seven to fifteen people (some say more) 
drowned in this place while awaiting an evacuation order that never 
came. Perhaps the hardest thing of all to comprehend, however, is that 
the federal government could make the extraordinary effort to build such 
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an elaborate planned community in 1943, only to abandon it — and its 
thousands of residents — in 1948.
Until recently, Vanport lived on in the reminiscences of former resi-
dents and their Portland neighbors, who watched the government’s 
“miracle” from a safe distance. In addition to being Oregon’s second 
largest city in 1943, Vanport was also home to the state’s largest African 
American community, making this government outpost an enduring 
landmark in the local history of regional race relations. Depending on 
the critic, Vanport was a textbook example of the excesses of the New 
Deal welfare state, a miraculous technology for labor efficiency, or a 
measure of how thoroughly the government converted the home front 
for war. Still others saw the founding of Vanport as a protective measure 
to prevent Portland from being overrun by a wave of newcomers and 
“undesirables.” Vanporters kept to themselves until the flood washed 
them into Portland, expanding the black community several times over. 
No matter how one tells the story of Vanport, the government’s hand in 
shaping the social landscape by creating this tightly controlled space is 
always the driving theme.
In Japanese American communities in Portland, San Francisco, and 
elsewhere, people tell a different story about life inside remote, govern-
ment-run wartime communities. In 1942–43, as Vanport materialized 
on the Columbia River flood plain, the War Relocation Authority (wra) 
threw up ten “relocation centers” — or concentration camps — in deso-
late areas of the West.1 They, like Vanport, would be fully self-sustaining 
enclaves whose populations would rival those of the region’s largest 
cities. Millard County, Utah, for instance, became the temporary home 
to the state’s fifth largest city, the Central Utah Relocation Center. The 
Center, better known as “Topaz,” was placed on 640 acres of scrub des-
ert, where roughly 8,100 internees lived in neatly lined barracks poised 
lightly on the land. In addition to unit after unit of cramped housing, the 
government equipped Topaz with hospitals, schools, a newspaper office, 
and mess halls that served as churches, movie houses, and community 
meeting spaces. While they were built for very different purposes, Topaz 
and Vanport shared more than their size or amenities. Their built envi-
ronments both displayed a government-issue uniformity that projected 
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regimentation rather than the mad chaos of building stemming from 
the easy money, unfettered optimism, and fervent individualism that 
generated the great western boomtowns.
The carefully arranged, demountable units at both Vanport and Topaz 
appeared ever ready to be whisked away upon orders from Washington, 
along with the people the government brought to live there. The barbed 
wire and armed guards encircling the all-Japanese desert city signaled 
that security, surveillance, and social control were the raisons d’être for 
this self-sustaining town. At first glance, the barbed wire, “yellow-peril” 
rhetoric, and desolation of the internment camps make any similarity 
to Vanport seem unlikely. But the government’s decision to solve its 
wartime problems by building “cities” instead of urban housing projects 
and prisons was an intriguing common thread. Placing Vanport into 
this broad but vaguely defined context raised the possibility that, despite 
its five-year history, the city was part of a larger historical picture that 
included open spaces, national security, the welfare state, demographic 
management, and the construction of “American communities” — both 
concretely and in the abstract. Thin as this thread might appear to be, it 
is clearly woven into a larger history of people, place, the federal pres-
ence, and the widely divergent experiences of being “American” in the 
wartime West.
Setting the two communities within a collective biography failed to 
reveal the full range of connections between them. A rigid comparative 
analysis missed some of the particularities of both places and did not 
help explain how their idiosyncrasies fit into larger narratives — and 
counternarratives — of “the American experience.” As strikingly similar as 
Vanport and Topaz were, there were also significant differences between 
them. It serves no purpose to warp the historical record by suggesting 
that the residents’ experiences were fundamentally the same, just as it 
is not useful to make totalizing statements about “the” social history of 
the West or advance conspiratorial notions that the federal government 
hatched a hundred-year plot to suppress minorities on the far side of 
the Rockies.
Writing two separate histories of Vanport and Topaz is certainly not 
necessary, as scholars from a range of disciplines have developed a rich 
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body of literature on the particular communities, ethnic groups affected 
by them, and local conflicts and their manifestations as individual griev-
ances with Washington. Instead of flattening these political, economic, 
and social histories to fit a rigid analytical construct, they are set within 
a single constellation that captures the broad context of this collective 
history, offers a fuller assessment of the significance of security towns 
to the West as a whole, and accounts for the uniqueness of each separate 
place while articulating the commonalities between them. The con-
stellatory scheme, which is gaining renewed currency within the field 
of cultural studies, has its origins in Theodor Adorno’s assertion that 
placing objects categorized separately into a single frame “illuminates 
the specific side of the object, the side which to a classifying procedure 
is either a matter of indifference or a burden.” Far from presenting an 
incoherent mash-up of people, plywood, and government agencies, this 
constellatory comparative approach highlights “the historical dynamic 
hidden within objects” whose various properties “[exceed] the classi-
fications imposed upon them.” In other words, the constellation lends 
complexity, not simplicity, to the individual and collective histories of 
federally run wartime communities.2
Vanport and Topaz were obvious selections for such a constellation 
with their noted similarities and because of what they might reveal about 
race, class, geography, and the differential restrictions on civil liberties 
during World War II. But race was only part of the story. The secret labo-
ratories of the Manhattan Project required fully developed townsites for 
reasons of both efficiency and security. Its processing plants at Hanford, 
Washington, and Oak Ridge, Tennessee, resembled Vanport’s labor-
efficiency system. Its third facility, hidden in the desert at Los Alamos, 
was a high-security installation where several hundred world-class sci-
entists disappeared in the race against Germany to develop the world’s 
first atomic bomb. The government put most residents in housing units 
that were dead ringers for Vanport apartments. Los Alamos also included 
a post exchange (px), a community center, a hospital, and space for a 
school that the scientists’ wives had to run themselves. These amenities 
were the only ones available because residents were not allowed to enter 
and leave the community freely. The top-secret town sat upon fifty-four 
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thousand acres of land as desolate as the alkali desert at Topaz and bound 
just as tightly by armed guards and barbed wire.
In addition to widening the geographic sweep of federal community 
building, Los Alamos was one of the few civilian enclaves populated 
with white elites (though many were émigrés from Axis nations and 
Jewish Americans). Although the reasons for the secrecy and security 
surrounding the bomb project were abundantly clear, it is curious that 
a group of renowned scientists and their families lived within the same 
stark surroundings as the war workers and internees. Topaz provided 
evidence enough that racial anxiety was central to federal demographic 
management — the process by which federal agencies gathered data on 
individuals, aggregated them into groups, marked them as potentially 
dangerous, and situated them physically in carefully demarcated spaces 
in calculated proximity to the general population. The purpose behind 
such careful management had less to do with known security concerns 
(individuals who engaged in criminal acts that compromised national 
security were, like most criminals, identified, arrested, charged, tried, 
and sentenced) than with creating the illusion that the government 
had internal dangers under control. It also was part of the larger, more 
practical picture of demographic management, which sought to move 
available workers to areas with clear, concrete labor shortages. Reser-
vations, internment camps, and public housing were always near and 
porous enough that resident labor could be deployed at the pleasure of 
the supervising government agency.
In most cases, “race” was the marker for “danger,” but the presence of 
Los Alamos suggested that less obvious concerns, such as the tendency 
toward eccentricity, pacifism, and radical politics on university campuses, 
might also be at play. Franklin D. Roosevelt’s expansion of the welfare 
state as well as his appointment of Jews to numerous prominent federal 
offices led Americans to rank Jews as the third greatest menace to the 
nation in February 1942; they were “less menacing” than the Japanese 
(ranked highest) and Germans, but considerably “more menacing” 
than blacks. When the townsite was under construction, in 1942, most 
Americans saw the Jewish population as eternally foreign, with 15 percent 
favoring their expulsion as a means of curbing their “excessive power” 
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in the United States.3 In the unknown city of Los Alamos, public opinion 
had little bearing on the surveillance and security structures. Still, Com-
manding General Leslie Groves and fbi Commissioner J. Edgar Hoover 
maintained longstanding suspicions of “reds” and “godless longhairs” 
that made intrusive surveillance structures as natural a part of project 
planning as laboratory equipment and housing provisions. The degree 
to which restrictions on personal liberties stemmed from concrete secu-
rity concerns or reflected other anxieties about the national, ethnic, and 
political profiles of the most powerful Los Alamosans is not immedi-
ately apparent. In light of the histories of the other three communities, 
however, this question clearly demands answers. This demand gained 
urgency with the espionage charges against Los Alamos scientist Wen 
Ho Lee in 1999, which revealed the intersections between racial anxiety, 
national security, and civil liberties. Although there was some indication 
that Lee, a naturalized Taiwanese American, mishandled some computer 
tapes, the evidence of espionage was slim, and the rush to place him in 
pretrial solitary confinement was tragically swift. Ultimately, the judge in 
the Lee case apologized for the botched legal proceedings, but the remedy 
came too late, as it did at Topaz, Vanport, and dozens of communities 
like them. Yellow-peril rhetoric swirled through the press, along with 
revelations that the Lee case accelerated the departure of talented scien-
tists of color already angered by the persistence of institutional racism at 
the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Despite the apology, Lee sustained 
irreparable damage: he could not regain the lost time with his family and 
at his job, his reputation, or his full capacity to live and work as he had 
before his arrest. The continued tension between security, profiling, and 
fidelity to the principles of American freedom from the mid-twentieth 
century into the twenty-first makes the history of Los Alamos a critical 
component of this larger constellation of federally managed wartime 
communities.4
The Klamath Indian Reservation in southern Oregon extends this 
history in the other direction by drawing the chronology to the nineteenth-
century origins of federal community building in the West. Tempting 
as it was to limit this study to World War II, it was impossible to ignore 
century-old federal settlements from the “Indian wars” that sit alongside 
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their twentieth-century counterparts. (Los Alamos and some of the wra 
relocation centers bordered or were built within the boundaries of Indian 
reservations.) Until Pearl Harbor, the “Indian wars” had been the last time 
Americans feared a military invasion of “their” West. Clashes between 
settlers pursuing America’s “manifest destiny” and southern Oregon 
tribes defending their homelands from white invaders brought escalat-
ing bloodshed in the 1840s and 1850s. While it was well understood in 
Washington that American settlers provoked most of these incidents, 
federal officials received compelling pleas from U.S. citizens for protec-
tion. A settler named “Rogue River Citizen” complained in 1855 that 
“we must tamely endure the presence and almost daily visits of the most 
cold-blooded murderers and midnight assassins that our country has 
ever been cursed with,” and that the government appeared to be more 
interested in protecting the Indians than fulfilling its constitutional 
obligation to provide for the common defense of its own citizens.5
Like many Oregon settlers, Rogue River Citizen called for the govern-
ment to use the newly established reservations to incarcerate the Native 
populations and worry less about their protection than their neutralization. 
Laying down the gauntlet, Rogue River concluded cynically, “Perhaps it 
is wrong to expect Uncle Sam’s men to fight, for it would be a loss to 
government should they get killed.”6 In less than a decade, nearly all the 
southern Oregon tribes were confined to reservations where, as an alter-
native to extinction, they would be trained to live as American citizens. If 
all went according to plan, the U.S. government would transform Indian 
“hostiles” into docile, loyal Americans.7
Despite its common origin in the wartime West, it is important to note 
that the Klamath Indian Reservation has a remarkably different history 
than Topaz, Vanport, and Los Alamos. First and foremost, the Office of 
Indian Affairs (known colloquially as the Indian Bureau) established 
the reservation as a permanent homeland for the Klamaths, Modocs, 
and Yahooskin Snake Paiutes in a treaty ratified by Congress in 1866. In 
exchange for ceding approximately twenty million acres of their ancestral 
lands and “acknowledg[ing] their dependence upon the Government of 
the United States,” the three tribes would share 2.2 million acres and an 
array of government goods and services, from food, clothing, and tools 
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to saw mills, schools, and medical care — all administered by the Indian 
Bureau. Army units stationed at nearby Fort Klamath would keep whites 
from encroaching on Klamath lands and prevent Indians from crossing 
the reservation boundary.
Within this stable, segregatory perimeter, however, the Klamath res-
ervation looks remarkably similar to its twentieth-century counterparts. 
Officials from the Indian bureau believed they created a replica of an 
American small town, where democratic institutions, structured work 
routines, controlled development of tribal assets, and the habits of Chris-
tian living would transform tribal members from “hostile Indians” into 
“good Americans.” It was a great show of faith in the power of America’s 
institutions to instill the values of individual freedom, democracy, free 
enterprise, and Christian morality in even the most resistant subjects, 
Americanizing the frontier one person at a time.8
The most significant event in postwar Klamath history, however, 
came in 1954, when the reservation was dissolved under the Klamath 
Termination Act. Termination, which sought to accelerate the process 
of assimilation through rapid detribalization, had been on the agendas 
of the War Relocation Authority, the Federal Public Housing Authority, 
and the Atomic Energy Commission for several years. Although the 
federal government built the four communities at different times and 
with different purposes in mind, it sought to rid itself of all four at the 
conclusion of World War II. The War Relocation Authority resolved to 
close Topaz and the other nine camps as soon as possible, starting in 
1943. Vanport’s future had been hotly debated since its dedication day, 
and the issues remained unresolved when the flood hit in 1948. For 
many, the disaster settled the question of how to encourage residents to 
reestablish their lives outside the project. Only Los Alamos was slated 
to remain, but the Atomic Energy Commission insisted upon a slow but 
steady conversion from a “communistic” colony to a more open society 
of independent individuals. This constellation measures the significance 
of both Topaz, Vanport, and Los Alamos’s common starting point and 
the government’s near-simultaneous termination of all four communi-
ties between 1943 and 1953, when even the Klamath Reservation was 
erased from the map.
Buy the Book
 Introduction | 9
After assembling this four-community constellation, situated within a 
120-year span in the history of the American West, I spent two years trav-
eling the West, poring over archival material, visiting whatever remained 
of the four communities, and interviewing former residents along the 
way. From the multitude of facts, figures, anecdotes, rumors, reminis-
cences, and questions come a set of persistent, if disparate themes: fear, 
suspicion, and stereotyping; displacement, protective custody, and isola-
tion; thin walls, lost privacy, cold nights, and bad food; regimentation, 
surveillance, ritualized citizenship, and limited economic horizons; 
powerlessness, anger, dependency, and stigmatization. It was evident 
that relationships of some sort existed between the four communities, 
but the nature and substance of these relationships, their meaning, and 
their larger significance was far less apparent.
The unique histories of Klamath, Topaz, Vanport, and Los Alamos are 
central to the story of the changing social landscape of the mid-century 
West, and while the order in which they were founded is somewhat tell-
ing, a straight chronology does not reach the most penetrating historical 
questions. Instead of recounting four histories and connecting them in 
the conclusion, this study is organized thematically, according to the 
phases of a consistent, if occasionally imperfect, pattern that shaped 
the histories of these government-run, high-security enclaves.9 In keep-
ing with Adorno’s concept of constellatory analysis, the chapters focus 
on the creation of these controlled spaces as security structures, the 
chasm between the American values the government promoted in these 
reformative communities and the authoritarian measures it practiced, 
the shrill dissonances of living as government wards in a region char-
acterized by its independent spirit, and the long-term consequences of 
inverse-utopian lives on residents’ experiences as American citizens. In 
addition to revealing numerous points of comparison, this constellation 
illuminates a consistent (if occasionally imperfect) pattern within the 
life spans of all four communities.
The pattern connecting these four places began in the anxious aftermath 
of an attack on the home front, with citizens feeling powerless against an 
intangible enemy and the government feeling pressure to make a visible 
defensive act. In response to public pressure and well-founded concerns 
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about the handful of likely saboteurs on the home front, the executive 
branch hastily constructed a profile of the “internal enemy.” Instead of 
singling out dangerous individuals, it cast a wide net over Americans 
with perceived ethnic or ideological ties to foreign threats, thus creating 
thousands of “enemies” with faces, bodies, and profiles that enabled 
officials to watch, detain, discipline, or reform them. Government agen-
cies rationalized subsequent measures to criminalize, isolate, and detain 
“enemies” and deny them fundamental rights as a preventative security 
measure, in which the government invades privacy, restricts movement, 
or confines individuals first and asks questions later. In the great Ameri-
can tradition of self-correction, questions of ethics and constitutional 
law were revisited when the danger had passed and such self-reflection 
became “safe” again. But the correction did not come before long-term 
damage was done to affected individuals, and Americans, coming to 
their senses, were faced with a shameful blot on the historical record. 
Yet Americans have been quick to forget these historical lessons in the 
face of renewed threats from “barbarians,” in the form of vaguely identi-
fied tyrants, savages, hostiles, saboteurs, Communists, terrorists, or, to 
use President George W. Bush’s early-twenty-first-century terminology, 
“evildoers.” Psychologists Robert Reber and Robert Kelley, in their cross-
cultural study of enmification (the psychological term for developing 
a profile of “the enemy”), contend that the creation of an identifiable, 
visible, and manageable enemy is not confined to aggressor nations. 
They argue instead that “the dangerous reality is that enmification can 
and does get loose in human affairs and, once it does, it impinges on 
the peace-loving no less than on the warlike.”10
The Historical Backdrop
This historical pattern of attack, enmification, confinement, 
Americanization, disposal, and discontent emerges against the backdrop 
of the history of westward expansion and Thomas Jefferson’s call to build 
an “Empire for Liberty” that would be a beacon to the world, fulfilling 
America’s historic destiny as the agent of individual liberty. The open 
spaces along the western frontier became the postrevolutionary proving 
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ground for the nation’s claims as the leading agent of global progress 
and human freedom. Jefferson inspired the new nation to build “such an 
empire for liberty as [the earth] has never surveyed since the creation” 
by transforming the “empty” region into the terrain of the indepen-
dent, wholly self-sufficient yeoman farmer.11 Journalist John O’Sullivan’s 
admonition to go “onward to the fulfillment of our mission — to the 
entire development of the principle of our organization — freedom of 
conscience, freedom of person, freedom of trade and business pursuits, 
universality of freedom and equality” was, and still is, readily accepted 
as America’s “high destiny,” “future history,” and “blessed mission to 
the nations of the world.”12
The confluence of American nationalism, the demands of growing 
capital markets, and the rise of physical anthropology and racial pseudo-
science provided the conceptual pieces for an intricate logic of national 
unity and racial difference that put white supremacy in the service of 
shared prosperity and human liberty. One of the most influential tracts 
on race and human capability was Samuel Morton’s Crania Americana 
(1839), a work of physical anthropology that forwarded a racialized social 
hierarchy based on the relative size of white, black, Native, and Asian 
skulls. As president of the Academy of Natural Sciences and professor 
of medicine at the University of Pennsylvania, Morton influenced a gen-
eration of social scientists who believed in the evolutionary potential of 
the “darker races” to become more like — if not fully equal — to whites. 
To scientists and the general public, the numbers described more than 
brain size; they indicated the potential for various non-white peoples to 
become fully self-determining individuals and contributing members 
of society. The most significant measure, however, was the degree of 
“fitness for self-government” attainable for each race. Caucasians, with 
“large and oval” skulls boasting “full and elevated” anterior portions, 
had heads outfitted to “attain the highest intellectual endowments.” In 
addition to giving humanity its “fairest inhabitants,” Caucasians had 
the ingenuity to settle across the earth, bringing the benefits of their 
highly evolved intelligence to the smaller-headed, darker races.13 Physical 
anthropologists debated the finer points of taxonomy and the evolution-
ary process, but Caucasians’ place at the top of the racial hierarchy was 
Buy the Book
12 | Introduction
considered an incontrovertible scientific fact. This understanding of 
“race” permeated public discourse as well, remaining in the popular 
imagination long after scientists questioned the validity of craniology’s 
pseudoscientific methods.
Morton’s measurements placed Asians next on the hierarchy as 
“olive-skinned” people whose intellect was “ingenious, imitative, and 
highly susceptible to cultivation.”14 In the evolutionist terms of the day, 
this meant that Asians could learn to be “civilized” by imitating their 
white superiors, whose influence would spur their evolution.15 Morton 
noted, however, that when compared to the “monkey race,” Asians were 
similarly unable to pay attention to any one thing long enough to carry 
it through effectively — like industrial innovation or democratic self-
governance.16 Although the “less civilized” races could unleash amoral 
bloodlust without provocation, Asian ingenuity and susceptibility to 
cultivation posed a threat of a different kind. Unlike people of African 
or indigenous American ancestry, Asians were savage and intelligent 
enough to imitate American technologies to use against them. This 
anxiety became a common trope in turn-of-the-century popular fiction 
and a persistent stereotype of the Japanese in the wake of their stunning 
naval victory in the Russo-Japanese War.17
Native Americans differed from Asians in more than their “brown” 
hue. Their smaller skulls made them “averse to cultivation” and placed 
them in a “continued childhood” from infancy to old age.18 These child-
like people were, on the flipside, “restless, revengeful, and fond of war,” 
with a “demoniac love of slaughter.”19 Like Asians, Indians were “crafty,” 
but they were “incapable of a continued process of reasoning on abstract 
subjects” and ate foods that were “disgusting” and “unclean.”20 These 
“eternal children” needed protection and discipline, lest their violent 
tendencies get out of control, or lower-order whites lead them toward 
corruption instead of civilization. Africans, the smallest-skulled popula-
tion and at the lowest tier of Morton’s racial hierarchy, were also “fond of 
warlike enterprises,” and their social institutions tended toward “super-
stition and cruelty.”21 They were intellectually unsuited to invention, but 
good at imitating “the mechanic arts.”22 This, combined with their ease 
in adapting to different circumstances and “yield[ing] to their destiny,” 
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made them well suited for slave labor.23 Despite being cast as childlike, 
they were only conditionally “innocent”; they were also uncontrollably 
violent and without moral restraint, threatening social chaos and a tyr-
anny of savagery and bloodshed.
This social order, combined with the notion of divine providence, 
made American colonization of Native lands, exploitation and social 
rejection of immigrants, and forcible expansion into Asian markets 
consonant with the liberating mission of civilization, Christianization, 
and expanding “free trade.” Those who took their proper place in society 
and complied with the tenets of American civilization would be included 
in the American body politic to the extent they were considered capable. 
Those who were incapable of self-government remained eternal children, 
of sorts, who were reasonably placed under the restrictive protection of 
their “civilized betters” so they were not crushed under the wheels of 
progress and, more importantly, did not impede its course. This elevated 
level of civilization, from which peace, prosperity, and God’s continued 
favor would follow, lay at the heart of the utopian vision of westward 
expansion.
Even after the reservation system put Indians at a safe distance from 
white settlements, westerners and Washington insiders remained anxious 
about real and imagined threats to the newly established social order 
along the American frontier. For all the utopian rhetoric of the West as 
the providentially bestowed “magnificent domain of space and time,” 
where the “noblest temple ever dedicated to the worship of . . . the Sacred 
and the True” would bring the nation of nations under the rule of “God’s 
natural and moral law of equality” and the “law of brotherhood,” white 
Americans held nightmarish visions of racial disorder that brought an 
end to liberty and civilization.24 In them, the “uncivilized races” used 
their powers of imitation to fashion American weapons and unleash 
their warlike characteristics against white Americans. In these scenarios, 
the Empire for Liberty was overrun by barbarian tyranny. Americans 
perceived this open, distant, freshly civilized region to be vulnerable 
to “Japanification” through trans-Pacific migration, enemy infiltration 
through Mexico, and domination by such “foreign” political movements 
as the American Communist Party.
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Popular fiction about Asian fifth columnists destroying western civi-
lization appeared as early as 1879, and more would follow in the 1890s 
with the closing of the western frontier and the acquisition of Hawaii 
and the Philippines.25 Japan’s real attack on the Pacific fleet at Pearl Har-
bor hit close to home, unleashing well-developed images of a Japanese 
apocalypse into American public life. As the facts of the attack melded 
with images from paperback novels of Japanese with super-weapons 
laying waste to California, Idaho, and Montana, the exotic charm of 
Japantowns gave way to perceptions of busy swarms of “Japanese spies 
and saboteurs, firmly entrenched through their Black Dragon Leagues and 
other Tokyo-controlled organizations in Japanese American communi-
ties on the West Coast.” The fbi found no evidence to support claims of 
Japanese disloyalty, but that fact did little to alter the public’s impression 
that Japanese immigrants and their citizen children had paved the way 
for an invasion of the California coast. So while the American West has 
been synonymous with power and freedom in the popular imagination, 
the military was regularly concerned that the region could be lost and 
that America’s manifest destiny, in which American civilization marched 
west, would remain unfulfilled. Yielding to domination from the East 
was as unthinkable as surrendering Oregon Territory to the Indians.26
President Franklin D. Roosevelt responded to Japan’s infamous attack 
by declaring war on December 8, 1941. With Executive Order 9066, issued 
on February 19, 1942, the government barred all persons of Japanese 
descent from the Western Defense Command, which encompassed 
much of Arizona, California, Oregon, and Washington. As with the 
Indians, all “known hostiles” on the fbi’s Custodial Detention Index 
(the secret listing of individuals slated for immediate arrest in the event 
of a national emergency) were summarily detained, while the remaining 
120,000 members of the Japanese American community, having com-
mitted neither crimes nor acts of disloyalty, were removed to isolated 
reservations operated by the Department of the Interior — the agency 
in charge of the Office of Indian Affairs.
These actions repeated the pattern within the federal government 
of palliating wartime anxieties by fashioning profiles of the “enemy” 
based on shared, immutable characteristics. Frequently, the characteristic 
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was “race,” a biological and cultural fiction that whites rewrote and re-
presented to accord with every new threat. Religion, political affiliation, 
and being a social outlier of some sort were less visible, malleable, and 
highly charged than “race,” but they still figured prominently in drawing 
“visible” profiles of “the enemy.” Attaching threatening connotations to 
the outward appearance of a “dangerous” group allowed a panicky nation 
to “see” its attackers and take comfort as the military and law enforce-
ment agencies collected them in a wide net, took them a safe distance 
away, and even isolated them in confined spaces for supervision at all 
times. This supposedly dangerous population was subject to discipline 
and punishment if they attempted to inflict any harm on America. For 
the majority whose containment was purely preventative, government-
run communities would aid their evolution toward true Americanism. 
Placed within a tableau vivant of middle-class Americanism, and through 
the temporal elaboration of the act(s) of “civilized” Anglo-American 
life (to borrow Michel Foucault’s description of modern disciplinary 
ritual), Indians could evolve to the point of assimilation, softening into 
the melting pot where they would no longer pose a threat. In any case, 
the government’s Japanese reservations demonstrated to the American 
public that the West was again secure, the status quo restored, and the 
nation’s powers of self-mastery fully intact.27
As World War II progressed, however, different threats — imminent 
and imagined — emerged before wary westerners. Bloody race riots swept 
through urban defense centers during World War I, and they would 
break out again in Detroit, New York, and Beaumont, Texas, in 1943. In 
cities crowded with newly arrived war workers, the riots brought forth 
Reconstruction-era nightmares of African Americans seizing a vulner-
able America to overturn the racial order. This fear was especially acute 
in Pacific states like Oregon, where black populations had historically 
been very small. Early security concerns that settlers of African descent, 
enslaved or free, might ally with disaffected Northwestern tribes against 
American settlers prompted the passage of exclusion laws that prohibited 
blacks from settling in Oregon Territory. These laws were folded into 
the first state constitution, and fear of a black apocalypse was woven 
into the local culture. As far as Oregon was from the South, Portland 
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audiences “applauded . . . cheered . . . and stood up in the intensity of 
their emotions as they saw the great mounted army of the Ku Klux Klan 
sweeping down the road” at the crowded premiere of D. W. Griffith’s 
Birth of a Nation in 1915.28 Even when the exclusion laws were lifted, black 
peril mythologies permeated the local culture, making it an inhospitable 
place for African Americans to live.29
When Portlanders stood firm against a plan to build public housing 
within the city limits, the Federal Public Housing Authority approved the 
construction of Vanport as a separate city. Residents moved to Vanport 
voluntarily and indeed quite happily in the wake of the Great Depression. 
They were not held in preventative detention, but their reservation was 
nonetheless bounded by its geographic and social isolation from Port-
land proper. fbi agents and internal police officers patrolled Vanport 
continuously, watching the black section of town and monitoring the 
activities of African American residents and their white friends who fit 
the profile of dangerous labor radicals. Vanport not only made it easy for 
shipyard workers to remain productive; it also made it easy to spot any 
“hostiles” — fascist sympathizers, Communists, or race rioters — before 
they could do any damage.
The government’s concerns about Communist infiltration were not 
confined to the “usual suspects” among ethnic minorities and the work-
ing class. When scientists sounded the alarm in Washington that the 
Germans might be developing an atomic bomb, Roosevelt approved 
the Manhattan Project, a top-secret military-civilian collaboration to 
develop this weapon of mass destruction before Hitler could use one on 
the United States. The impressive assemblage of foreign and American 
scientists at the research facility at Los Alamos was enough to assure even 
the most nervous insiders that the Allies would have a fighting chance. 
What disconcerted them, however, was the number of great lights whose 
“political tendencies” matched those of the fbi’s two enemy profiles: 
foreign fascists and homegrown Communists. Both groups were well 
represented on the Bureau’s Custodial Detention Index, which, along 
with Japanese American community leaders, included high-profile Axis 
nationals like Enrico Fermi and Emilio Segrè as well as American-born 
activists and intellectuals like J. Robert Oppenheimer.30
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The longstanding conflation of Jewish immigration with revolutionary 
activity in the United States influenced the planning of the Manhattan 
Project. Classified by Samuel Morton as Caucasians, Jews were considered 
civilized, though they fell between the northern Europeans at the top of 
the Caucasian hierarchy and the Aryan “Hindoos” at the bottom.31 To 
most Americans, it was not cranial size, skin tone, or religion that made 
Jews suspect Americans, but the perpetual myth of a worldwide Jewish 
conspiracy to put the rest of the world under their economic and political 
control. One of the most visible watchdogs of the “international super-
capitalist government” held together across the Jewish diaspora by a bond 
of “blood, faith, and suffering” was Henry Ford, whose articles for the 
Dearborn Independent in 1920 were in the mainstream of American political 
discourse.32 He warned that Jews, like Asians, segregated themselves in 
ghettos to consolidate their power within the United States and refused 
to assimilate because they were a communal people, financed with old 
money from Europe to gain power for the race “wherever there is power 
to get or use.”33 Ford described the world’s Jews as “the world’s enigma”: 
they were small in numbers and rejected by much of the world, yet in 
the United States alone they were members of the most powerful circles, 
from the Supreme Court and the inner circle of the White House to the 
center of international finance.34 Holding themselves out as a “superior 
race,” Jews had no reason to assimilate, having amassed an “undue and 
unsafe degree of power” by maintaining “the adhesiveness of an intense 
raciality.”35 Ford’s final warning admonished Americans to be alert to 
the number of Jews involved in the Russian Revolution and to note that 
“[Jewish] Students of that Red School are coming back to the United 
States” having refined revolutionary activity to “a science.”36 Their ultimate 
vision was a United States inhabited only by “‘slavs, Negroes, and Jews, 
wherein the Jews will occupy a position of economic leadership.’”37
Ford enumerated several characteristics of Jews that put them at odds 
with the independent yeoman farmer. Jews were communal and con-
nected to powers apart from and outside the United States. They were 
clannish and tyrannical in their determination to “[fasten] a yoke on 
society.” They excelled in every enterprise but farming, because they 
were “not men of the land” like the American frontiersman. Like hostile 
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Indians, Japanese Americans, and multiethnic labor radicals, Jews were 
conspiratorial and deceptive; Ford cited the practice of using Gentile 
banks and trust companies to create a “front” that allowed them to hide 
Jewish influence. Worst of all, the presumed conspiracy to control the 
world’s people and resources could thwart the American project for 
individual liberty.38
The many foreign and domestic Jewish scientists — and their close 
associates — were perceived as having dangerous, disloyal tendencies 
that, like those pinned to Indians, Japanese Americans, and multiethnic 
laborers, threatened the future of freedom and the progress of manifest 
destiny with Jewish conspiracy or Communist revolution. Jewish scientists 
like Leo Szilard, who persuaded the Roosevelt administration to initiate 
the bomb project, came under additional scrutiny by agents who noted 
how often they ate lunch in a deli, had their hair cut by Jewish barbers, 
or spent time with Jewish friends. Ultimately, Szilard was considered too 
great a risk to be housed at Los Alamos. Although there is no record of 
overt anti-Semitism on the Manhattan Project, one scholar of the period 
identified centuries-old “Jewish peril” fantasies in which Jews across 
the diaspora used their wealth, talent, or intellectual abilities to enter 
the halls of power and stealthily create a Jewish-dominated world. His 
wartime polling data led him to conclude that “Jews were considered 
nonconforming strangers with a self-centered morality [that] permitted 
them to undercut the patriotism of the larger society.”39
After screening out active Communists and determining that the net 
“brain gain” from Hitler’s Europe was worth the risk of sheltering scien-
tists from the Axis nations, the American government placed the remaining 
scientists, worrisome political tendencies and all, behind barbed wire and 
armed guards to work for the duration of the project — and hopefully for 
the American cause. To ensure the loyalty of the scientists, censors read 
their mail, military intelligence listened to their conversations, guards 
prevented anyone from entering or leaving, and the bodyguards hired 
to “protect” them did double-duty as informants. If all went according 
to plan, the fortified community at Los Alamos would protect America 
from both the terrifying threat of Hitler’s nuclear ambitions and the 
slightly less worrying danger of enemy infiltration.
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After the government identified the enemy within — or the people 
who looked or thought like them — its next step was to create a space 
to contain and neutralize these enemy bodies. By 1943 nearly 674,000 
Americans and resident aliens were removed from the mainstream and 
placed in government-run political, social welfare, and national security 
structures.40 The government’s bounded communities included 1,500 
people at the Klamath Indian Reservation, 8,100 at Topaz, and 40,000 at 
Vanport. Los Alamos jumped from about 300 to nearly 1,500 residents 
between the first scientists’ arrival in 1943 and the day of Japan’s sur-
render in 1945. Preventative detention, from its starkest form at Topaz 
to the softer variation at Vanport City, may have quelled mainstream 
America’s wartime anxieties, but it posed an ideological, if not an ethical 
dilemma. The true strength of the “land of the free” lies in its ideals, not 
its exercise of overwhelming state power. The very freedom the United 
States worked to cultivate in the West and to restore to victims of fascist 
tyranny required a commitment to due process for all, creating the con-
ditions for social equality and economic opportunity. With these ideals 
in mind, the government sought to nurture and strengthen residents’ 
patriotic feelings by providing them with scaled-down, highly mediated 
“American small towns” to replace the home communities from which 
they were removed.
Guarded little communities seemed like the way to address every-
one’s wartime concerns. Rehabilitative spaces had, after all, been part of 
the American social landscape for generations, ranging from religious 
communes, asylums, and company towns to the Farm Security Admin-
istration’s subsistence homestead projects for displaced workers. In the 
wartime communities, the enmified were taken a safe distance from the 
western home fronts so they could build temporary lives or even improve 
them through supervised work routines and the daily rituals of American 
small town life.
It was no coincidence, then, that the federal government transferred 
several members of its staff from the Office of Indian Affairs to the War 
Relocation Authority when the time came to design the relocation centers. 
Nor was it a coincidence that Indians in defense industries, Japanese 
American internees being relocated to Portland at the end of the war, 
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and the occasional Hanford worker were placed at Vanport, where they 
would still be in undoubtedly very familiar, government-supervised 
surroundings. The federal government’s system of highly controlled 
communities was far from a random collection of odd little enclaves. It 
promoted them as utopian settlements where, for instance, internees 
would “reclaim the desert” and scientists would find their “ideal city.” 
As individuals who had committed no crimes or acts of disloyalty, the 
residents were not cast as “detainees” but as pioneers of a sort, whose 
plywood settlements contained the stuff of which their own American 
dreams would be made.
The pattern continued as federal officials crafted quasi-democratic 
institutions to suit their “all-American” authoritarian communities. Com-
munity councils, modeled loosely on the nation’s legislative bodies, were 
considered de rigueur among Washington planners, if not the residents 
themselves. The composition and procedures differed somewhat in each 
of the four communities, but they all afforded the residents the oppor-
tunity to pass resolutions that government project directors could veto 
(or simply disregard) at their discretion. One War Relocation Authority 
employee, observing the community affairs at another relocation center, 
described the internees’ project of supervised self-government as the 
creation of a “cultural structure of realistic democracy.”41 Awkward as 
it is, the phrase captures the dissonance between the wra’s desire to 
promote democratic practices and its regime of confinement and social 
control. In cases where elected officials proved “disruptive,” wra project 
directors could appoint “appropriate” representatives in their place. 
A certain amount of disagreement was tolerable, but antigovernment 
protests were taken as a sign of greater subversive intentions. In a true 
democracy, every participant exercised an equal measure of power. In 
the government’s small towns, every resident, from elected officials to 
children, was equally powerless against the rule of the federal government. 
Residents at Topaz and Los Alamos recalled their near-identical experience 
of serving on the student councils in high school with a bit of irritation. 
If the government failed to persuade its charges, it took advantage of the 
residents’ isolation and dependency to encourage conformity. Agents 
leveraged access to resources, placed troublemakers under surveillance, 
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and used intimidation, threats, and incarceration in ways that would be 
suspect constitutionally in the more visible corners of society.
Although free enterprise and economic self-sufficiency were the cor-
nerstones of American citizenship (at least ideally), free market capitalism 
was a world away from America’s bounded communities. Government 
agencies controlled supply and demand, set wages in many communities, 
and provided little opportunity for free enterprise, for managing assets 
to build wealth, or for receiving the benefits of full banking services. 
Hard work was viewed as an indicator of loyalty and cooperativeness, not 
personal ambition, wage-worthiness, and the all-American drive to “do 
better” for oneself and one’s children. With the exceptions of Vanport, 
where people earned and saved (though many lost their savings in the 
flood), and the Tech Area at Los Alamos (where scientific careers flour-
ished), federal agencies created low-paying jobs to keep people busy, to 
supplement depleted labor pools outside the community, and to offset 
the cost to the government of running total communities.
Despite the challenges of living in federally run towns, residents 
worked cooperatively to build truly functional American societies. 
Klamath Indians created public parks, Topazians played baseball, Van-
porters formed religious congregations, and Los Alamosans ran their 
own little theater — not because they were trying to “look American,” 
but because they were Americans who strived to live according to the 
values of community, independence, participation, and freedom from 
excessive government control. The isolated enclaves were staging areas 
for America’s tragic ironies in which innocent individuals were denied 
the promises of American life and the ideals that supported the promise 
were undermined.
The irony deepened to hypocrisy in 1945 when the political landscape 
shifted from beating back fascism to stamping out the Red menace. Hit-
ler had no bomb, and the fear of race riots (and certainly Indian raids) 
paled in comparison to the specter of global Communism. As the hot 
war turned cold, government enclaves were cast as collectivist dystopias, 
and Washington called for all of them — including the Indian reserva-
tions — to be dismantled. Finding themselves suspect yet again, Topazians 
and Vanporters faced being uprooted from the places that had sustained 
Buy the Book
22 | Introduction
them (however marginally) and thrown back into the mainstream to sink 
or swim. Los Alamos, too critical to the Cold War to be discarded, could 
not continue to exist as a government-run collective. Its transition to a 
“real American town” involved reconfiguring openness and security into 
a scientific fortress for the postwar age.
This final part of the pattern emerged fully when the rush to dismantle 
all things collective led Congress back to the reservation system, which 
produced the original federally run communities. Termination bills 
abounded, voiding most treaty obligations and dissolving tribal land 
bases. The vast majority of these bills terminated the tribal status of 
small bands on fairly small land bases, which proved devastating to the 
individuals in these communities. Klamath was one of three targeted 
reservations with a sizable population and land base, making its ter-
mination a milestone in Congress’s push for radical individualism and 
free market democracy. The Klamath Termination Act of 1954 liquidated 
the reservation and re-categorized detribalized Klamaths as “legal non-
Indians,” suggesting that even after the reservation era they would be both 
insiders and outsiders in America. Removing the geographic borders did 
little to bridge the wide gap between those who lived inside and outside 
the government’s bounded communities, and many Klamaths fell into 
the breach. Generations of powerless politics, gainless economics, and 
education for second-class citizenship left most Klamaths unprepared for 
the postwar consumer age. One tribal member lamented in the 1980s that 
after termination, “we were just a bunch of people with nothing.”42
In isolating and confining people to federally controlled towns, the 
government pursued the incompatible goals of protective custody and 
preemptive incarceration. In other words, the government awkwardly 
attempted to protect its enmified populations while curbing their rights 
and freedoms without cause. Government agents’ initial optimism about 
its Americanization programs gave way as a “detention psychology” 
took hold among the residents, manifesting itself in a loss of initia-
tive, a sense of alienation, and increased dependency.43 The prescribed 
rituals of self-governance, the work routines, and the opportunities to 
demonstrate one’s Americanness were undermined by the isolation and 
forced dependency of people who had previously been socially engaged 
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and economically self-sufficient. The government’s conclusion that life 
in the internment camps “loomed only as a blank interlude in what had 
been up to then a purposeful life” held true at other government com-
munities as well.44 Federal officials’ claims to having provided arenas of 
self-empowerment were soon met with the reality that government-run 
communities made dependents of formerly independent people, making 
the benefits of full citizenship elusive in the years and even decades after 
the communities had disappeared.
Each part of this pattern is elaborated in the chapters that follow. 
Chapter one examines the process by which Indians, Japanese Ameri-
cans, a multi-racial labor force, and atomic scientists were cast as having 
dangerously disloyal tendencies based on race, ethnicity, and political 
affiliation. Chapter two centers on the communities themselves and 
the government’s attempt to build structures to restrict freedom and 
promote democracy simultaneously. Chapter three considers the eco-
nomic impact of the artificial economies of federally run enclaves, and 
how this frustrated residents’ pursuit of the American ideal of the self-
made individual. Chapter four focuses on how the slippages between 
democratic rhetoric and life as government wards affected residents’ 
experiences as loyal Americans. Chapters five and six trace the process 
behind the rapid disposal of the four enclaves and its surprisingly trau-
matic impacts, particularly on the Klamath Tribes, whose extensive, 
years-long termination process requires a chapter of its own to fully 
recount this complicated history. The final chapter assesses the long-
term effects of these communities on the residents, the surrounding 
communities, and the American nation. Although the individual stories 
vary considerably, they all underscore the failure of these communities 
to project the American values they purported to enshrine. The fact that 
they made more skeptics than believers of their residents make them 
not American’s utopias but its inverse utopias.
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Inverse Utopias in the West: Americanism in Reverse
The idea of the federal government building utopian 
communities at all is an odd one because spiritual seekers and political 
dissidents have been the main architects of America’s utopian experi-
ments. From New Harmony to Onieda to the Hog Farm, Americans 
voluntarily opted out of the mainstream to escape the moral corruption 
of Washington, Wall Street, and popular culture in the hope of recap-
turing lost values and reestablishing them in American life. Utopia is, 
generally speaking, a longed-for place to which one either journeys or 
hopes to return. The government’s utopian communities, by contrast, 
were built for conformity to the status quo and to reform individuals, 
not society as a whole. Federal agencies populated their utopias with 
suspects to manage, not seekers following their hearts.
There is a hidden logic to the government’s invocation of “utopia,” 
but it ties these four communities to the utopian vision of the West, not 
to the tradition of smaller utopian communities. Jefferson’s vision of 
westward expansion rests on the literal definition of “utopia” given in 
the Oxford English Dictionary: the “imaginary, indefinitely-remote region” 
and a “place, state, or condition ideally perfect in respect of politics, 
laws, customs, and conditions.” His Empire for Liberty populated by 
independent yeoman farmers formed what historian Henry Nash Smith 
describes as “an agrarian utopia in the West” where land, liberty, and 
freedom were linked symbiotically.45
America’s utopia is not an isolated place like Thomas More’s fic-
tional island that emblazoned the idea of “the best place” (which was 
also “no place”) in the western imagination. All the world is America’s 
utopia, subject to transformation by independent Americans bringing 
liberty, individual freedom, and the capacity for self-government to the 
uncivilized reaches of the continent, leading all humanity toward the full 
enjoyment of their natural rights. Morton’s racial hierarchy coupled with 
the Jeffersonian ideal of educating for democracy served as an organiz-
ing structure that harmonized white supremacy and social equality in a 
single ideological frame. Utopia, then, would produce self-governing, 
self-determining, self-made individuals, starting with white European-
Buy the Book
 Introduction | 25
American settlers, and bringing Natives, immigrants, blacks, and other 
“inferior” races up the evolutionary scale toward greater civilization, 
if not fitness for full citizenship. Monarchy, Communism, barbarism 
and other forms of tyranny would find no fertile soil in the West, and, 
in time, the American beacon would shine into the dark corners of the 
world, lighting the way to freedom of all.
In all eras, America’s expansive Empire for Liberty has been held 
out as a “high example” to the world that would “smite unto death the 
tyranny of kings, hierarchs, and oligarchs.” Successfully defending the 
West from foreign invaders, hostile Indians, predatory Japanese, and 
Communist traitors was not a mere matter of national security; it was 
proof that the American experiment had succeeded, and that the United 
States would continue to fill its manifest destiny as “the great nation of 
futurity” under whose direction civilization would evolve to its highest 
levels. Although the built environment in the utopian Empire for Liberty 
is less prominent than in other utopian experiments, its social and politi-
cal architecture served much the same function as its more materially 
based urban counterparts.46
The federal government’s reservations and security towns were built 
with certain utopian ideals in mind. To the outside world, they were struc-
tures that contained potential dangers at a moment when the promise 
of American freedom was vulnerable. With a mixed population of the 
mostly innocent and a handful of true hostiles, they gave assurances that 
those who were disloyal to the cause of American freedom were contained 
and under watch. The loyal people who were caught in the government’s 
dragnet, either by virtue of having been swept up and moved or having 
moved voluntarily into a zone of heavy surveillance and control, would 
have the opportunity to become better Americans by developing those 
abilities in scaled-down political, economic, and social institutions that 
were ultimately controlled by federal agencies. Government agents and 
security structures created perfect little Americas where, theoretically, 
nothing bad could happen. No one would be without food and shelter, 
and everyone would have something productive to do. The wheels of 
democracy would never turn too fast to make sweeping changes, and 
dissent would never reach disruptive levels. The schools would teach 
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children to value freedom and social equality in the classroom, without 
making too much of their own segregation from the rest of the nation. 
Scaled small and tightly enclosed, these enclaves offered a refuge from 
the complexities of real life in America, in favor of life stripped to its 
fundamentals. It was, in a sense, Americanism with training wheels for 
people who needed them as well as those who did not.
Ordinarily, these time-honored institutions ensured that every citi-
zen participated in self-governance and enhanced prosperity through 
self-directed economic activity. In Topaz, Vanport, Los Alamos, and 
Klamath, however, these scaled-down institutions actually worked in 
inverse fashion. Political participation was an exercise in powerlessness, 
the government-controlled economies forged bonds of dependency in 
otherwise self-sufficient people, and the public schools left many stu-
dents behind their mainstream peers in the postwar era. The political 
limitations, government-controlled economies, and confusing educa-
tional programs bred isolation and dependency, not participation and 
self-sufficiency. While far from utopias, the four communities were not 
quite dystopian; they were, after all, free of the extreme repressive violence 
and exterminationist mission of concentration camps in Europe. Rather, 
they were inverse utopias, built to both limit and promote freedom. They 
removed people from the even playing field of American opportunity and 
instilled skepticism and dissent in otherwise cooperative individuals 
who, in large part, were doing what the government asked of them to 
help realize the future of American freedom.
But these controlled, miniaturized Americas did not capture every spy 
or saboteur; in fact, the illusion of containment drew attention away from 
individuals who ultimately harmed the nation because they did not fit the 
government’s profile of the enmified. And instead of nurturing freedom, 
inverse utopian life cut people off from the political process, ended lives 
of economic independence, and made thousands of patriotic individuals 
question the sincerity of America’s fundamental beliefs. These would-
be utopias were bound in space and closed off by geographic or social 
distance, secrecy and silence, or barbed wire and armed guards. The 
utopian ideals of freedom remained the lingua franca of these enclosed 
spaces, defending democracy was their central concern, and the spirit 
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of reform for racial and political outsiders stayed firmly in place. But 
instead of freedom flourishing, invasive government agencies fell into 
tyrannical practices. Far from shining a beacon for the world, the inverse 
utopias became fodder for Axis propagandists, who beamed stories about 
them to “prove” that American freedom was a fantasy spun from empty 
rhetoric. Instead of uniting America’s diverse peoples in a structure of 
ever-evolving freedom, the inverse utopia drove wedges along lines of 
race, class, region, privilege, and politics. Intended as neither havens nor 
prisons, Klamath, Topaz, Vanport, and Los Alamos were inverse utopias 
that “proceed[ed] in the reverse direction” (part of the OED’s definition 
of “inverse”) — not rejecting American ideals, but turning them inside 
out to make them formless and hollow.
What began as a history of weird American places became a history 
of how the government has arrayed people, space, power, and concep-
tions of American identity in wartime, and the hazards of mistaking the 
government’s inversion of American ideals for its protection of them. 
Americans’ deep faith in their supposedly divinely ordained mission has 
always been accompanied by an equally strong apocalyptic fear that for-
eign interlopers, evil savages, or greedy tyrants would destroy the nation’s 
experiment as a free and open society, twisting freedom of speech into 
weapons of propaganda and using freedom of assembly to unleash violent 
internal chaos. It appeared to some that the great American melting pot 
could become a boiling cauldron of subversion. Fearful citizens turned 
to the state to control suspect peoples, guarantee security at any cost, 
and preserve American dreams of progress and perfection.
The government’s small inverse utopias were intended to protect the 
utopian Empire for Liberty envisioned for postrevolutionary America 
by Jefferson and enacted through westward expansion. Pitting ideals 
of freedom against realities of profiling and social control brought the 
opposite of what the government had intended. They may have calmed 
the uncertainty of a nation under attack, but in the long term these com-
munities undermined the bedrock principles of independence, fidelity 
to due process, and a brotherhood of self-determining individuals under 
the banner of freedom and civilization in the Empire for Liberty.
As the dystopian vision of losing the West to savagery and tyranny 
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took hold, and as enmification and profiling eclipsed fidelity to the Con-
stitution, Klamaths, Topazians, Vanporters, and Los Alamosans — and 
thousands of others who lived in communities like theirs — came to 
question the government’s dedication to the values it proclaimed to pro-
tect. John O’Sullivan’s utopian brotherhood under equality gave way to a 
Mortonian world of categorization and control in which Americans less 
capable of democratic self-government had to be contained, cultivated, 
and deemed loyal and capable of taking part in society. These tensions 
have contributed to the complicated history of American freedom and 
how its ideals evolved in the “untrodden lands” of the American West 
and fed back into the national discourses of peacetime inclusiveness 
and wartime segregation.
This history fills in a portion of the long and tumultuous story of the 
federal presence in the West and addresses the significance of west-
ern developments to the nation as a whole. Historians of the West, like 
westerners themselves, have grappled with the complicated relationship 
between freedom and restriction in the West and the significance of this 
dynamic to the American experiment as a whole. Frederick Jackson Turner, 
in addition to affirming Jefferson’s vision and O’Sullivan’s call, argued 
that the region’s function as America’s safety valve was essential to the 
nation’s political stability. Ultimately, Turner’s westerners became exem-
plary Americans, showing easterners the true meaning of independence, 
non-whites a model of civilization, and Americans everywhere a clear 
sense of identity. While historians like Earl Pomeroy challenged Turner’s 
“frontier” construct by shifting focus to urban centers and institutions, 
the Turnerian West remained historical orthodoxy until the 1980s. All at 
once, a “gang” of four New Western historians rode onto the scene for 
a showdown with Turner’s adherents and, to a lesser extent, with one 
another. Patricia Nelson Limerick and Richard White rejected Turner’s 
safety-valve image, but their descriptions of the West’s relationship to 
the nation differed dramatically. Where Limerick described the region 
as the nation’s “potential dumping ground, a remote place to which to 
transplant people whose presence annoyed, angered, or obstructed the 
majority,” White cast it as the “kindergarten of the state” from which 
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newly formed social ideas flow back to the nation as innovations, rather 
than refuse.47
In the West’s inverse utopias, Turner’s, Limerick’s, and White’s asser-
tions hold true (which is perhaps a good measure of just how strange 
these communities were). Their inhabitants, branded “undesirables” by 
the federal government, were removed to remote locales, where neither 
their presence nor their problems would disturb national unity. Each 
project was, in its way, an experiment in social engineering and demo-
graphic distribution situated precariously within the American democratic 
tradition. Klamath, Topaz, Vanport, and to a lesser degree Los Alamos 
served as kindergartens of a sort, where residents received training in the 
fundamentals of Americanism. The region, in turn, became the govern-
ment’s laboratory for an experimental synthesis of authoritarianism and 
democracy that would defend the nation from unknown internal enemies 
in times of war. The federal government thus built its western empire, 
but whether it served the cause of liberty for all, as Jefferson imagined, 
remains an open question.
For instance, generations of freedom-seekers have piled into wagons, 
train cars, and Volkswagen vans and headed west to escape the many 
constraints of the East, from the rigid dictates of civilized society to the 
overbearing institutions of a federal government that is too near. While 
the myth of radical freedom remains embedded in America’s vision of 
the West, residents and scholars of the region know well that the thou-
sands of miles between Washington and its western frontier did little to 
ameliorate government influence. Historians remind us that the federal 
government distributed the land that drew settlers west, secured the 
terrain with forts and military bases, invested in massive infrastructure 
projects from dams to nuclear power plants, and continues to manage 
its 760-million-acre holdings across eleven western states.48
Yet the sheer concentration of inverse utopias in the West made them a 
powerful influence on the region’s political and social landscape. While 
southerners struggled with Jim Crow, westerners grappled with the conse-
quences of the federal government’s wartime demographic management 
scheme (or, as President Roosevelt put it in 1942, “hav[ing] the right 
numbers of the right people in the right places at the right time”).49 
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This new manifestation of the federal presence went beyond pitting 
newcomers against established western communities to hardening the 
government’s grip on western land and regional policy, fueling the hos-
tility of many westerners toward their leaders in Washington. Contrary 
to the individualism and egalitarianism that characterized American 
freedom, the federal government categorized, marked, and segregated 
specific populations and restricted rights that were inalienable to all 
the other loyal, law-abiding people in America. The tensions never fully 
eased, and westerners continue to struggle over power, place, and who 
among the old-timers and newcomers, Natives and scientists, European 
Jews and Japanese immigrants, African Americans and staunch political 
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progressives truly belongs in the region. Federal demographic manage-
ment contributed significantly to the course of race relations in the West, 
and it is an element that distinguishes this history from the trajectories 
of slavery and European immigration that shape the national narratives 
of race, citizenship, and American nationhood.
Finally, all four cases underscore the fact that inverse utopias deprived 
loyal Americans of fundamental freedoms based on grave miscalculations 
about the treacherous tendencies of ethnic minorities, industrial work-
ers, and perceived radicals. Their histories serve as reminders that the 
balance between maintaining a sense of national security and preserving 
the integrity of the principles of American freedom is a delicate matter, 
requiring thoughtful policy instead of impulsive initiatives. It should 
come as no surprise, then, that Americans who spent time in inverse 
utopias gave a great deal of thought to questions of civil liberties and 
national security. In the decades that followed the war, they marched at 
civil rights demonstrations, presented testimony to Congress, led cam-
paigns for redress, ran for office, and served as the conscience of the 
nation by committing their views to print. This activist engagement took 
its most visible form when Japanese American civil rights organizations 
mobilized in defense of Arab and Muslim Americans who were subject 
to preventative detention following the al-Qaeda attacks on New York 
City and Washington dc in 2001. In a completely unintended way, the 
inverse utopias did make their residents into exemplary American citi-
zens; as self-appointed guardians of civil liberties, it is they who keep 
watch on the government and resist every sign of tyranny, the ultimate 
un-American activity.
This is some of the history that lies beneath the bleachers at the Portland 
International Raceway and within the eroded foundations that form the 
last trace of Topaz. It is a history that ties the bustling science town of 
Los Alamos, in which Colonel Sanders looks out upon one of the few 
cities in America where the federal government owns more property than 
corporate America, to the tranquil paths of the Winema National Forest, 
which was part of the Klamath Reservation until termination acts wrested 
it from the Indians in the 1950s. In the Klamath Basin, it brings together 
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Oregon’s Nikkei and Native communities on the Japanese American Day 
of Remembrance.50 Gordon Bettles, steward of the Klamath Longhouse, 
was taught by his parents to view the abandoned site of the Tule Lake 
Relocation Center as part of his own social geography. Bettles recounted 
his parents’ history lesson in an interview in 2006. They began with the 
story of the internment itself, adding that the Japanese Americans were 
“treated like animals; they said this is exactly what happened to the Modoc 
tribe when they were forced off their cultural property and placed on 
the Klamath reservation. If you think about it, the reservation they kept 
us in was like internment. We couldn’t leave unless we had passes, we 
couldn’t communicate with other tribes.” The article features another 
community member, Hiroto Zakoji, a former internee at Tule Lake who 
was hired by the Klamath Tribes to serve as general manager and director 
of the Klamath Adult Indian Education and Training Program.
These ties are becoming more widely recognized and memorialized; the 
Confederated Tribes of the Grande Ronde, for instance, are major donors 
to the Japanese American Art Memorial in Eugene, Oregon, in recognition 
of their shared histories of “hardship, government betrayal, denial of civil 
liberties and racism, but also (and some would say more importantly) of 
community, cultural preservation, and perseverance.”51
There have been great erasures in these histories, making the con-
nections between them all but invisible until now. This is due in part to 
the longstanding perception that each community’s “unusual history” 
made residents’ struggles solely their own. The cloak of wartime secrecy 
that surrounded every inverse utopia dampened voices very early, and the 
federal government has had little reason to say much about places that, 
in its view, no longer exist (or no longer exist in federal-utopian form). 
Former residents have understandably engaged in a great deal of self-
censorship for decades. Some chose to focus on the future, while others 
tried to deemphasize the strangeness of their wartime experiences. Still 
others avoided discussing the poorly understood circumstances of their 
lives in inverse utopias for fear of re-stigmatizing their experiences.
Although there were vast differences between the experiences of the 
four populations, they all shared the marginalization, repression, dis-
placement, and disillusionment with federal government that flourished 
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within the confined spaces of America’s inverse utopias. Most impor-
tantly, their experiences are not theirs alone; they are part of a patterned, 
national wartime dynamic that makes certain citizens of the Empire for 
Liberty into enemies while the government fights to extend the blessings 
of American freedom to every corner of the globe.
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